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The paper elaborates the notion of innovation as an emerging property of complex system dynamics
and presents an agent-based simulation model (ABM) of an economy where systemic knowledge
interactions among heterogeneous agents are crucial for the recombinant generation of new
technological knowledge and the introduction of innovations. In this approach the organization of the
system plays a crucial role in assessing the chances of individual ﬁrms to actually introduce
innovations because it qualiﬁes the access to external knowledge, an indispensable input, together
with internal learning and research activities, into the recombinant generation of new knowledge. The
introduction of innovations is analyzed as the result of systemic knowledge interactions among
myopic agents that are credited with an extended procedural rationality that includes forms of
creative reaction. The creative reaction of agents may lead to the introduction of productivity
enhancing innovations. This takes place only when the structural, organizational and institutional
characteristics of the system are such that agents, reacting to out-of-equilibrium conditions, can
actually take advantage of external knowledge available within the innovation system into which they
are embedded to generate new technological knowledge. The ABM enables one to explore effects of
alternative organizational features of the systems, namely different conﬁgurations of the intellectual
property right regimes and different architectural conﬁgurations of the regional structure into which
knowledge interactions take place, on the rates of introduction of technological innovations. The
results of the ABM suggest that the dissemination of knowledge favors the emergence of creative
reactions and hence faster rates of introduction of technological innovations.
Complex System Dynamics, Innovation, Emergent Property, Technological Knowledge,
Intellectual Property Rights, Knowledge Dissemination
 Introduction
The article develops an agent based simulation model (ABM) of innovation considered as an
emerging property of a complex system. It explores how architectural, organizational and institutional
variables, such as the spatial distribution of ﬁrms and the intellectual property right regime, have an
impact on innovative behaviours. Firms are considered as myopic agents that may react creatively
to un-expected events. Their reaction may be adaptive or creative, according to the localized context
of action. The reaction of agents may lead to the introduction of productivity enhancing innovations if
and when the organization of the system is such that the reactive agents can actually take
advantage of external knowledge available within the innovation system into which they are
embedded. In this approach external knowledge is an indispensable input, together with internal
research activities, into the generation of new knowledge.
Our approach contributes a line enquiry of evolutionary economics that emphasizes the role of
interactions among agents within the organized complexity of economic systems. This approach
differs from evolutionary analyses of a darwinistic ascent where innovation is spontaneous and
occurs randomly, in house capacities are considered as the unique source of novelty creating
activities and market are credited with the role to select alternative novelties (Penrose 1959; Nelson
and Winter 1982).
In our approach innovation is an emerging property at the system level that takes place when the
action of individuals and the organization of the system match. Knowledge interactions among
heterogeneous agents and the organization of the knowledge ﬂows within the system play a crucial
role in assessing the chances of individual ﬁrms to actually introduce innovations. The access to
external knowledge is viewed as an indispensable input, together with internal learning and research








activities, into the generation of new knowledge. The introduction of innovations is analyzed as the
result of systemic knowledge interactions among myopic agents that are credited with an extended
procedural rationality that includes forms of reaction. Such reactivity can be either adaptive or
creative. The reaction of agents can be creative so as engender the introduction of productivity
enhancing innovations when a number of contextual conditions that enable the access to external
knowledge are fulﬁlled (Anderson Arrow Pines 1988; Lane 2009; Zhang 2003; Antonelli 2011).
The aim of the paper is to show that, because of the relevance of external knowledge for the
generation of new knowledge, the organization of the system articulated in the different institutional
and architectural settings of the structure into which knowledge interactions take place, affects the
rates of generation of new knowledge and the pace of introduction of technological innovations
(Bischi Dawid Kopel 2003).
Using ABM methodology, the paper shows that innovation is likely to emerge faster and better in
organized complex systems characterized by high levels of dissemination and accessibility to
knowledge externalities.
The rest of the paper is structured as it follows. Section 2 elaborates the theoretical framework and
presents the building blocks of an approach that integrates the economics of innovation and the
economics of complexity. Section 3 presents the agent-based model of the innovation system.
Section 4 exhibits the results of the simulation focusing upon the alternative hypothesis about the
institutional and architectural features of the innovation system. Section 5 elaborates the policy
implications of the results. The conclusions summarize the main results and put them in perspective.
 The theoretical frame
This section presents the basic assumptions and hypotheses about the working of an economic
system where innovation is characterized as the emergent property of the system dynamics of
knowledge interactions. The introduction of innovations is analyzed as the possible result of
systemic interactions among heterogeneous and myopic, yet learning and reactive, agents when and
if they can take advantage of external knowledge so as to make their reaction, creative, as opposed
to adaptive.
A behavioral approach enriched by creativity
There are direct links between the Schumpeterian legacy and the behavioral theory of the ﬁrm that
have been poorly appreciated so far. Schumpeter (1947) in a landmark contribution introduces the
notion of creative reaction as a conclusive point of his theoretical elaboration. Schumpeterian ﬁrms
are portrayed explicitly as myopic agents that are not able to foresee all the possible events and are
occasionally surprised by un-expected events. Schumpeterian ﬁrms are myopic but endowed with
the capability to react and to rely upon external resources in their reaction. Their reaction to the
changing condition of their economic environment can be either adaptive or creative. If their reaction
is adaptive, equilibrium conditions prevail and lead to traditional price/quantity adjustments with no
innovation. Their reaction becomes creative, as opposed to adaptive, when knowledge interactions
supported by a viable organization of the system makes possible to access external knowledge at
favorable conditions[2]. Creative reaction engenders out-of-equilibrium conditions and with
appropriate external conditions feeds a virtuous cycle of growth and change (Antonelli 2011).
This Schumpeterian legacy is fully consistent and actually complementary with the basic
assumptions of the beahavioral theory of the ﬁrm elaborated by Herbert Simon and Jamie March. In
the classic behavioral theory ﬁrms are myopic: their rationality is bounded, as opposed to Olympian,
because of the wide array of unexpected events, surprises and mistakes that characterize their
decision making and the conduct of their business in a ever changing environment (March and
Simon 1958). Firms, however, are endowed with an extended procedural rationality that includes the
capability to learn. Agents are intrinsically heterogeneous. They are characterized by distinctive and
speciﬁc characteristics that qualify their competence, the endowment of tangible and intangible
inputs and their location in the space of interactions (Cyert and March 1963; March 1988; March
1991).
In our approach agents can do more than adjusting prices to quantities and vice versa: they can try
and react to the changing conditions of their economic environment by means of the generation of
technological knowledge and its exploitation by means of the introduction of technological
innovations. To innovate ﬁrms mobilize their slack resources consisting in tacit knowledge and
competence accumulated by means of internal learning processes (Leibenstein 1976). Internal slack
resources, however, are a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition to innovate. The reaction becomes
creative only with the support of an organized complexity of the system where ﬁrms are embedded
A behavioral theory of a myopic but learning ﬁrm enriched by the Schumpeterian creativity provides
the basis to implement a model of the economic complexity of technological change. In our approach
ﬁrms try and innovate when their performances differ sharply from the average. A clear causality
between performances, both negative and positive is established. When performances are below the
average ﬁrms are dissatisﬁed and try to change their routines. When performances are above the
average, ﬁrms have more opportunities to fund risky activities. This out-of-equilibrium causal link, in







difference with the post Nelson and Winter approach where no causality is introduced and innovation
is viewed as the spontaneous result of the behavior of ﬁrms considered as single agents.
Innovation and knowledge
The introduction of technological and organizational innovations requires the generation of new
knowledge. The generation of knowledge is characterized by speciﬁc attributes: knowledge is at the
same time the output of a speciﬁc activity and an essential input into the generation of new
knowledge. Because of knowledge indivisibility, the access to existing knowledge, at each point in
time, is a condition necessary for the generation of new knowledge. Yet no ﬁrm can command all the
available knowledge, hence no ﬁrm can generate new technological knowledge alone. The twin
character of knowledge as an output of a research process and the input into the generation of
further knowledge stresses the basic complementarity and interdependence of agents in the
innovation process: innovation is inherently the collective result of the interdependent and interactive
intentional action of economic agents (Blume and Durlauf 2001 and 2005).
The structure of the system and its continual change, following the tradition of analysis of Simon
Kuznetz, play a crucial role. The organization and the structure of the system affects the architecture
of knowledge externalities, interactions and transactions and plays a crucial role in the access to
external knowledge and hence in the deﬁnition of the actual chances of agents to implement their
reactions and make it creative, as opposed to adaptive (Silva and Teixeira 2009).
Technological knowledge is viewed as the product of recombination of existing ideas, both
diachronically and synchronically. The generation of new knowledge stems from the search and
identiﬁcation of elements of knowledge that had not been previously considered and their subsequent
active inclusion and integration with the preexisting components of the knowledge base of each ﬁrm
(Weitzman 1996 and 1998; Fleming and Sorenson 2001).
Marshallian externalities as implemented by the notion of generative interactions play a central role in
this approach (Lane and Maxﬁeld 1997). The amount of knowledge externalities and interactions
available to each ﬁrm inﬂuences their capability to generate new technological knowledge, hence the
actual possibility to make their reaction adaptive as opposed to creative and able to introduce
localized technological changes. Each myopic agent has access only to local knowledge interactions
and externalities, i.e. no agent knows what every other agent in the system at large knows. Because
of the localized character of knowledge externalities and interaction, location in a multidimensional
space, in terms of distance among agents and their density, matters. Interactions in fact are
localized, as opposed to global. At each point in time agents are rooted within networks of
transactions and interactions that are speciﬁc subsets of the broader array of knowledge
externalities, interactions and transactions that take place in the system. In the long term, however,
they can move in space and change their location in the networks. In so doing they change the
organization of the system.
Contingent factors inﬂuencing innovative vs. adaptive behaviors
Appropriate structural and institutional characteristics of the system upgrade the reaction of ﬁrms
and help to make it actually creative and hence engender the introduction of productivity enhancing
innovations. Only when the role of such external and complementary systemic conditions is taken
into account the role of innovation as the productivity enhancing result of an intentional action can be
articulated. The organization of the system plays a key role as it shapes the access to external
knowledge. When the role of the external context is properly appreciated, it becomes clear that
innovation is not only the result of the intentional action of each individual agent, but it is also the
endogenous product of dynamics of the system. The individual action and the organization of the
system conditions are the crucial and complementary ingredients to explain the emergence of
innovations (Lane et al. 2009).
Positive feedbacks take place when the external conditions into which each ﬁrm is localized qualify
the access to external knowledge so as to make the reaction of ﬁrms creative, as opposed to
adaptive. When the access conditions to the local pools of knowledge enable the actual generation of
new technological knowledge and feed the introduction of innovations, actual gales of technological
change may emerge. The wider is the access to the local pools of knowledge and the larger is the
likelihood that ﬁrms are induced to react. The larger the number of ﬁrms that react and the better the
access conditions to external knowledge and the stronger are the chances that their reaction are
creative: technological change becomes a generalized and collective process (Arthur 1990, 1994,
2009).
In such a context innovation is an emergent property that takes place when complexity is 'organized',
i.e. when a number of complementary conditions enable the creative reaction of agents and makes it
possible to introduce innovations that actually increase their efﬁciency. The dynamics of complex
systems is based upon the combination of the reactivity of agents, caught in out-of-equilibrium
conditions, with the features of the system into which each agent is embedded in terms of
externalities, interactions, positive feedbacks that enable the generation of localized technological
change and lead to endogenous structural change (Anderson, Arrow, Pines 1988; Arthur, Durlauf,





Innovation is the endogenous result of the system dynamics: it does not fall from heaven, as
standard economics suggests. Neither is it the result of random variation as some evolutionary
approaches, consistently with their with strong darwinistic traits, where mutation take place randomly,
contend. Agents react and succeed in their creative reactions when a number of contingent external
conditions apply at the system level. Innovation is the result of the collective economic action of
agents: "innovation is a path dependent, collective process that takes place in a localized context, if,
when and where a sufﬁcient number of creative reactions are made in a coherent, complementary
and consistent way. As such innovation is one of the key emergent properties of an economic
system viewed as a dynamic complex system" (Antonelli 2008:I).
The appreciation of the systemic conditions that shape and make innovations possible, together with
their individual causes leads to the identiﬁcation of innovation as an emergent property of a system.
Our approach provides a solution to the conundrum of an intentional economic action whose rewards
are larger than its costs. This can happen only if the complexity of the system is appreciated. The
introduction of innovations that make it possible to enhance the productivity and efﬁciency of the
system can in fact take place only as the emergent property of an organized system complexity and
in turn organized complexity is explained as an endogenous and dynamic process engendered by
the interactions of rent-seeking agents, that try and cope with the ever changing conditions of their
product and factor markets (Antonelli 2009 and 2011).
Architectural and institutional trade-offs
In this context, because of the twin character of knowledge as the output of a research process and
the input into the generation of further knowledge, two knowledge dissemination trade-offs take place.
The ﬁrst relates to the structure of intellectual property right regimes; the second to the distribution in
economic, regional and knowledge space of knowledge generation activities. Let us analyze them in
turn:
A) The intellectual property right trade-off. The structure of the intellectual property right regimes, the
scope of patents, their duration, the assignment procedures and their exclusivity play a crucial role.
Strong intellectual property right regimes increase the appropriability of technological knowledge for
they limit the leakage of information and delay uncontrolled knowledge dissipation. Innovators can
secure for a longer period of time the beneﬁts stemming from the generation of new technological
knowledge and the introduction of new technologies. Strong intellectual property regimes increase
the chances of innovators to exploit technological knowledge. Consequently strong intellectual
property right regimes enhance the incentives to the generation of new knowledge and hence help
increasing the amount of resources that would be committed to the generation of new knowledge.
Strong intellectual property right regimes, however, reduce both the static and the dynamic efﬁciency
of economic and innovation systems. Strong property right regimes increase the duration of
monopolistic power in the product markets and the appropriation of consumers' surplus by innovative
suppliers. Strong property right regimes, however, reduce the dynamic efﬁciency of innovation
systems because they prevent and delay the access to existing knowledge as an input into the
generation of new knowledge and hence reduce the efﬁciency of the recombination process that
leads to the generation of new technological knowledge. The combined effect of strong property right
regimes in fact is to increase the incentives to generate research ad hence the amount of resources
but the reduction of their efﬁciency because at each point in time available knowledge cannot be
used to recombine and generate new knowledge and must be invented again. Strong intellectual
property right regimes risk to increasing the replication of research efforts and the reduction of the
pace of recombinant generation of technological knowledge. This knowledge trade-off requires the
ﬁne-tuning of intellectual property rights with the identiﬁcation of the proper mix of the protection of
appropriability on the one hand and the dissemination of available knowledge.
B) The architectural trade-off. The architectural characteristics of the network of interactions that
qualify each economic system have powerful consequences on the actual capability of each
economic agent to generate new technological knowledge. The distribution in regional and knowledge
space of knowledge generation activities has important effects. Because of the pervasive role of
external knowledge as an input into the recombinant generation of new technological knowledge the
regional concentration of knowledge generating activities may increase the pace of technological
advance. Proximity, in fact, helps the identiﬁcation of useful external knowledge hence reduces
search and exploration costs. Proximity in regional space helps reducing the risks of opportunistic
behaviors because of increased interactions, hence helps limiting transaction costs and ﬁnally
proximity increases the homogeneity of codes and favors the absorption of external knowledge.
Excess concentration may favor the forging ahead of small but effective clusters of highly innovative
groups of ﬁrms strongly interconnected and able to interact at a fast pace. At the same time,
however, excess concentration might be identiﬁed where the rest of the system is cut of the ﬂows of
creative interactions and the dissemination of new knowledge is delayed. Excess concentration risks
to reduce knowledge variety and the related opportunities for knowledge recombination. The
dissemination of knowledge generating activities may help the stimulus to the recombinant generation
of new knowledge because of the wider participation of a larger number of heterogeneous agents in
the collective endeavor that leads to the generation of new knowledge. Once more it is clear that a
knowledge trade-off between concentration and dissemination of knowledge generating activities
takes place with important policy implications about the best allocation of additional research








Agent based models can help structuring in a rigorous frame of analysis the dynamic properties of
the system so as to provide a context into which the implementation of simulation techniques can
exhibit the different results of alternative structures of knowledge interaction mechanisms and
intellectual property rights regimes[3]. This exercise can contribute the implementation of an approach
that adapts complex system dynamics to economics where technological change is the central
engine of the evolving dynamics of the system and it is the result of the creative response of
intentional agents, embedded in an evolving architecture of market, social and knowledge
interactions (Aghion, David, Foray 2009; Terna 2009).
The simulation of the working of an economic system where technological change can take place
implements the basic intuitions of complexity theory and of economics of innovation. The simulation
will enable to identify the proper solutions to the two knowledge trade-off that have been identiﬁed
with respect to the structure of intellectual property right regimes and the regional distribution of
knowledge generation activities.
Let us now turn our attention to analyze the building blocks of our agent-based simulation model. The
following section shows how the use of the basic tools of agent-based simulation can implement a
rigorous representation of the dynamics of a full-ﬂedged economic system where agents are credited
with the capability of generating technological knowledge and generating technological innovations
provided a conducive architecture of network interactions and an effective intellectual property right
regime is implemented.
 The simulation model
The working of the system of interactions and transactions that qualify the simple but articulated
economic system outlined in the previous section can be explored by means of an ABM in order to
investigate the dynamics of the innovation process at the system level[4]. ABM provides with the
opportunity to explore the full range of implications of a multilevel structure of interactions and
transactions as framed in the previous section and to take into account the variety of outcomes of
the decisions taken by each heterogeneous agent (Pyka Werker 2009; Terna 2009).
The ABM implemented in this section operationalizes, through the interactions among a large number
of objects representing the agents of our system, the working of a typical complex process
characterized by the key role of Marshallian externalities and augmented by the Schumpeterian
assumption that ﬁrms are credited with the capability to try and innovate according to the levels of
their performances and the context into which they are localized (Dawid 2006).
The model assumes that ﬁrms are boundedly rational but endowed with procedural rationality
enriched by the capability to react and to innovate when and if a number of external circumstances
are provided. The rationality of their behaviour is objective, as opposed to subjective. Firms in fact do
react to the dynamics of both product and factor markets but never maximize. Their reaction includes
the possibility to innovate, instead of sheer adjustments of quantities to prices.
In the ABM demand and supply meet in the market place; production is decided ex ante; ﬁrms try and
sell their output in the product market, where customers spend their revenue. The matching between
demand and supply sets temporary prices that deﬁne the performances of ﬁrms. According to the
levels of their performances and the availability of external knowledge ﬁrms can fund dedicated
research activities to try and innovate (Lane 2009).
In the simulation, heterogeneous ﬁrms produce homogeneous products sold into a single market. In
the product markets the households expend the revenues stemming from wages (including research
fees) and the net proﬁts of shareholders. In the input markets the derived demand of the ﬁrms meets
the supply of labor provided by workers, including researchers. For the sake of simplicity, no
ﬁnancial institutions have been activated, nor payments can be postponed. Shareholders supply the







Figure 1. Fluxes into the simulated economy
Market clearing mechanisms based exclusively upon prices maintain a perfect equilibrium between
demand and supply. Such equilibrium is ensured for both the product and the factor markets: the
quantities determine the correct price that ensure the whole production be sold. No friction neither
waiting times are simulated, factors are assumed to be immediately available. Here the joint
reference to the Marshallian and Schumpeterian legacies play a key role to understanding the
working of such markets. At each point in time the market equilibrium is typically Marshallian, as
opposed to Walrasian. Here exchanges occur after production. Production has been taking place
according to the plans based upon the expectations, beliefs and technological competence of each
agent. For each transient market price, because agents are heterogeneous, some make proﬁts and
other incur losses. Following the Schumpeterian traits of our model, however, no convergence can
take place as long ﬁrms introduce innovations and hence keep changing the attractors.
The production function is very simple, in order to avoid matters related to different kinds of
production processes, inputs availability, warehouses cycles and so on, outputs depend exclusively
from the amount of employed work and its productivity. Both labour and productivity vary among
ﬁrms: labour depends on the entrepreneur's decision about the growth of the production. Productivity
is a function of the technological level the ﬁrm achieved through innovation.
The whole output is sold on the single product market, where the revenue equals the sum of wages,
dividends and research expenses and the price depends on the liquidity. According to the temporary
price levels, proﬁts are computed as difference between income and costs, no taxes are paid,
neither part of the proﬁt can be retained into the enterprise. Shareholders either will receive the
proﬁts or reintegrate the losses.
Heterogeneous ﬁrms are localized into an economic structure represented as a regional and
technological space. Both spaces are managed as grids divided into cells each of which can host an
unlimited number of ﬁrms. The position into the regional grid determines the neighbourhood into which
ﬁrms can observe their competitors, comparing results. The position of each ﬁrm in the technological
grid measures its productivity and deﬁnes the possibility to access quasi-public knowledge. The
distribution in the two space dimensions is not consistent: ﬁrms technologically very close could be
positioned in far distant cells of the regional space and vice versa. In this way the absorption of
technological knowledge spilling from ﬁrms based in regional and technological proximity may enable
the introduction of an innovation with positive effects in terms of productivity growth.
The localization of agents in both space dimensions is the result of their past activities and yet it can
be changed at each point in time. The results obtained during a production and consumption cycle
inﬂuence the strategies the agents will take during the next cycle. Hence the dynamics of the model
is typically characterized by path dependence: the dynamics in fact is non-ergodic because history
matters and irreversibility limits and qualiﬁes the alternative options at each point in time. At each
point in time, however, the effects of the initial conditions may be balanced by occasional events that
may alter the 'path' i.e. the direction and the pace of the dynamics (David 2007).
The ﬁrms into the model, in fact, are always comparing their performances in terms of proﬁts, to the
neighbours average results, the difference between own ﬁgures and neighbours average ones
increases the motivation to innovate. Transparency is clearly local: the ray within each ﬁrms can
observe the conduct of other ﬁrms is limited accordingly with a parameter value. Beyond that ray
information is scarce and costly.
The farther is proﬁtability from the average and the deeper the out-of-equilibrium conditions. Firms
can innovate if the results are under the average level, to improve their performances, as well as
when the results are above the average level, to take advantage of abundant liquidity and reduced
opportunity costs for risky undertakings. Innovation is viewed as the possible result of intentional
decision-making that takes place in out-of-equilibrium conditions. The farther away is the ﬁrm from3.13
3.14
3.15
equilibrium and the stronger the likelihood for innovation to take place. Hence we assume a U-
relationship between levels of proﬁtability and innovative activity, as measured by the rates of
increase of total factor productivity (Antonelli and Scellato 2011).
Summarizing, ﬁrm increases its motivation to innovate each time its performance is found to be far
enough from the average. Such a motivation become stronger and stronger if the enterprise's relative
position remains outside a band for several and consecutive production cycles: after a parametrically
set number of consecutive cycles the enterprise performs an innovation trial.
The simulation of the innovation process
ABM enables to explore in detail the innovation process and the role within it of the external factors
that shape the recombinant generation of technological knowledge. At each point in time ﬁrms can
react so as to try and increase their productivity. Hence they can move and change their regional and
technological localization by means of research costs. The research costs are directly related to the
actions performed by each ﬁrm to innovate, either:
mobilize internal slack competence,
absorb external knowledge spilling from neighbours,
move to other location in order to exploit more developed neighbours.
We assume a sequence of innovative steps. At ﬁrst ﬁrms try and mobilize their own internal slack
competence. The ﬁrms that have not sufﬁcient potential try and absorb the external technological
knowledge spilling from a neighbour and, if knowledge absorption is not possible, they can move
randomly to another location into the physical space. Let us consider them in turn:
a.  ﬁrms can mobilize their internal slack competence accumulated by means of learning
processes. The ﬁrms of the model are endowed with the ability to learn better ways to perform
their production cycles. Each time a production cycle is done, ﬁrms acquire and cumulate
some technological potential. Such a potential can be transformed in actual innovation only by
means of appropriate research activities and access to external knowledge. Firms are able to
build up competence by means of learning processes. The accumulation of experience
proceeds at a speciﬁc internal "learning rate" that is biased by the impact of external "learning
factor" that reﬂects the competence level of the enterprises' neighbourhoods, measured as the
average productivity of the neighbours enterprises. The competence can be transformed in
real innovation when a parametrical threshold is reached, at a cost. Because the internal slack
competence is seldom sufﬁcient to support the recombinant generation of new technological
knowledge and hence the actual introduction of a productivity enhancing innovation, ﬁrms
explore the technological and regional space into which they are localized and try to access
and absorb the knowledge of their neighbours (March 1991).
b.  absorption enables to take advantage of the technology introduced by other ﬁrms: because of
absorbing costs however it is not free. The effective access to external technological
knowledge requires substantial resources in exploration, identiﬁcation, decodiﬁcation and
integration into the internal knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal 1989 and 1990). Moreover,
because of bounded rationality, ﬁrms can observe only the other ones that lay in a certain
neighbourhood whose extension depends on a "view" parameter: his value limits the number of
positions all around the agent it can explore. Due to the fact the simulated world is managed as
a grid the position of the agent limits this view: agents in a corner have less possibility to
observe than other located in the middle of the grid, as well as agents in a very crowded
neighbours have more information than isolated ﬁrms. Note that a single position into the grid
could pile several agents, so simply exploring its cell an agent may found other ﬁrms to
observe. 
The view parameter determines only the number of cells the agent can access, the real
number of other ﬁrms it can observe depend upon the evolution of the agents' distribution and
constitutes an emerging phenomenon that continuously evolves during the execution of the
simulation. When the agent is located near the end of the grid its capability falls dramatically. 
A major constraint to the possibility to take advantage and absorb others' technologies is
represented by intellectual property rights (IPR). In order to model a credible IPR regime we
allow enterprises to patent their technology and hence to retain exclusive exploitation rights for
a certain number of cycles (Reichman 2000). 
By observing other ﬁrms each ﬁrm knows the latest technological level they apply that is not
covered by a patent licence. The key parameter "patent expiration" is used to experiment
different scenarios, its value determines the number of production cycles each innovation
remains hidden to the competitors. It is plausible to expect that the longer is the patent period,
value of the patent expiration parameter (pe), the higher will be the research effort: unless
enterprises were given the exclusive possibility to exploit the research results, no private ﬁrms
would be interested in investing money, because their discovery would be immediately
available for competitors. In the model, even with patent expiration equal to zero, the new
technology is exploited exclusively by the innovating enterprise for almost one cycle. 
Observed technologies can be absorbed only if the distance between them and the own ones
is less than a parametrical value, so called "knowledge absorption threshold". This limitation
has been introduced to avoid dramatic jumps in the productivity of ﬁrms that would be not
plausible. Knowledge absorption has a cost equal to the named distance. Because the








space, when knowledge absorption gives poor or null results enterprises could decide to move
into another location in order to meet better technological conditions.
c.  relocalization. The third way to improving productivity levels consists in moving around the
physical space in order to reach more interesting neighbours. When the mobilization of
competence and knowledge absorption are not viable solutions, ﬁrms can try and move
randomly to another location in the hope to found better developed zones. Movement is limited
by a parameter called "jump", its value determines the maximum amount of cells the ﬁrms can
go through vertically and horizontally back or forward; the effective number of cells the
enterprise will move is determined randomly into this range, that constitutes a Von Neumann's
neighbour. Moving costs are directly related to the distance between the original and the new
location.
Here we see how the structure of the system inﬂuences in several ways the innovation chances of
the enterprises: learning is faster for ﬁrms that operate in a well developed neighbour, and imitators
have higher possibilities to observe and copy if they operate into a crowded and technologically
advanced environments (Ozman 2009).
Firms are endowed, at the start of the simulation, with a competence and a technological level,
randomly tossed for each into the lowest quarter of the possible values, following a uniform
probability distribution. The simulations started with low skilled ﬁrms, with a uniform distribution
among them, both to give each ﬁrm:
the possibility to express its own development path,
a similar starting situation to analyze the different development paths.
In the real world, knowledge centres, like universities, technical and management schools and so on,
are located unevenly in the geographical territory with clear effects: a large evidence conﬁrms that
ﬁrms operating in geographical regions whit an high density of such organisations have higher
chances to access higher level of knowledge. To introduce these aspects in the simulation model we
have represented geographical regions by means of physical spaces where competence is
distributed following different conﬁgurations: from a full concentration in a limited space to a well
disseminated distribution. Knowledge centres are represented by ﬁrms with very high technological
level (so called 'genius'), whose initial knowledge endowment is randomly tossed within the highest
quarter of the possible values, whereas normal agents are given values in the lowest one.
Neighbours can take advantage of the external knowledge spilling from the 'genius' within the
boundaries of the knowledge absorption threshold value set up for the simulation. Hence the higher
the knowledge absorption possibility is and the stronger is the inﬂuence of the genius to their
neighbours. The patent duration does not slow the effect because the initial knowledge is pretended
to be an old and public one.
In order to experiment different scenarios the number of genius is parametrically managed and could
be set to zero to exclude this effects. The distribution in space of agents is tossed randomly at the
beginning of the process but it becomes fully endogenous as agents are credited with the capability
to move in regional space searching for the access to external knowledge spilling in the proximity of
'genius'. Hence the dynamics of the regional distribution of agents exhibits the typical traits of path
dependence.
The process is non-ergodic but not past-dependent: small variations can exert important effects in
terms of emergence of strong clusters or, on the opposite, progressive dissemination in space
(D'Ignazio and Giovannetti 2006; Antonelli 2008).
 Results of the simulations
The strength of the ABM consists in the possibility to assess in a coherent and structured frame the
systemic consequences of alternative structural conﬁgurations of the properties of the system.
Simulation techniques allow to exploring the outcomes of different hypotheses concerning key issues
of the model within a structured and consistent frame that takes into account the full set of direct and
indirect effects of the interactions of agents (Pyka Werker 2009).
The results of the simulation conﬁrm that the model is consistent and able to mimic the working of a
complex system where rent-seeking agents react to the changing conditions of the product and
factor markets. Hence the results conﬁrm that the set of equations is able to portray the working of a
complex system based upon a large number of heterogeneous agents on both the demand and the
supply side that are price taker in product markets. Markets clear with temporary equilibrium price.
The replication of the temporary equilibrium price in the long term conﬁrms that the model is
appropriate to explore the general features of the system when the reaction of ﬁrms is adaptive and
consists in price to quantity adjustments. In the extreme case where ﬁrms cannot innovate for the
lack of internal competence to be mobilized and external knowledge to be absorbed, the system
mimics effectively the working of static general equilibrium in conditions of allocative and productive
efﬁciency but with no dynamic efﬁciency. The markets sort out the least performing ﬁrms and drive
the prices to the minimum production costs. This result is important because it conﬁrms that static
general equilibrium is the simple and elementary form of complexity that takes place when agents










with the introduction of innovations, the equilibrium conditions become dynamic and all the key
features, such as the prices, the quantities, the efﬁciency and the structure, of the system keep
changing (Antonelli 2011).
Innovation is effectively an emerging property of the system because it takes place when the
external conditions and the structure of the system provide access to the external knowledge that is
crucial to feed the effective recombinant generation of new technological knowledge and hence the
actual introduction of productivity enhancing innovations by ﬁrms that try and cope with the changing
conditions of the system doing more than sheer adjustments of prices to quantities.
The access to external knowledge is necessary to achieve the effective recombinant generation of
new technological knowledge and to eventually introduce new technologies. The structural
characteristics of the system into which ﬁrms are embedded are crucial to enable the reaction to
become creative and hence to introduce innovations that increase their productivity.
The simulations provide key information about the two knowledge trade-offs and enable to assess
the systemic effects in terms of dynamic efﬁciency of alternative conﬁgurations of the intellectual
property right regimes and architectures of the network interactions We have explored the
consequences of two sets of hypotheses: 1) the effects of different durations patents and 2) the
effects of different architectural properties of the system in terms of distribution of ﬁrms with high
levels of technological competence.
The effective recombinant generation of technological knowledge and the consequent introduction of
technological innovations is tracked and quantiﬁed in terms of productivity growth, measured as the
ratio of input - output. Firms that are able to take advantage of knowledge externalities, to generate
successfully new technological change and hence to introduce better technologies, will experience
an increase in the general levels of efﬁciency of their production process and will experience higher
mark-ups with evident positive consequences on productivity levels.
The changes in productivity levels affect the dynamics of the system not only in terms of average
rates of growth but also in terms of variance. Growth cum technological change is far from a steady
increase. On the opposite it exhibits ﬂuctuations that are typical of long term Schumpeterian process
of creative destruction. Occasionally the majority of ﬁrms incur major losses due to the mismatch
between their current cost conditions and the performances of a few radical innovators able to
introduce breakthrough innovations. In a typical Schumpeterian process we see that the introduction
of radical innovations engenders occasional phases of decline in output. It is interesting to note that
the ﬂuctuations are sharper when the pace of technological change is higher and more speciﬁcally in
the conﬁgurations of spatial distribution and appropriability regimes that make faster the rates of
introduction of technological innovation and hence of productivity growth.
Let us now consider in turn the alternative results that are obtained with different structural
conﬁgurations of both the intellectual property right regimes and the spatial distribution of ﬁrms[5].
The ﬁrst knowledge trade-off: Intellectual property right regimes
The ﬁrst question the simulation has been employed to investigate refers to the role of patent
protection in promoting and sustaining the innovation. The well-known IPR trade-off can now be
investigated (Harison 2008;Vandekerckhove and De Bond 2008).
Intellectual property rights enable ﬁrms to secure exclusive rights on the technological knowledge
they have generated. By means of IPR enterprises can exclude competitors from the exploitation of
such new technologies and consolidate an effective competitive advantage. At the micro level patent
protection reinforces the motivation to innovate giving the enterprise the possibility to exploit its own
innovation in an exclusive way (hereafter "reinforcing effect").
Moving from our basic assumption that the introduction of innovations builds upon in the
recombination of existing knowledge it is clear that the patent protection has a negative effect: the
longer the protection lasts the slower the new technologies can spread among ﬁrms (hereafter
"slowing effect") (Gay, Latham, Le Bas 2008).
This research investigates both the effects focusing on the inﬂuence they have on the innovation
process. The simulations has been run using the following model set up:
all the ﬁrms (agents) operated into a common market and district,
all the ﬁrms started from a similar level of technologies, randomly tossed into the ﬁrst quarter of
the achievable technologies following a uniform distribution,
each ﬁrm was given high capability to observe the neighbours and to absorb external
knowledge,
the unique parameter that varied among the simulations was the "patent expiration", i. e. the
time, in production cycles, a new technology was owned by the innovator and not available to
the other agents in the system.
The probability ﬁrms try to innovate even if their results are similar to their neighbours ones is
positively correlated to the patent expiration since it is less than one hundred; for values









far from the neighbours ones.
Two sets of experiments have been executed both based upon the observation of the average
productivity level the agents achieved after a determined number of production cycles. In the model
productivity is positively correlated to the technology, so the more a ﬁrm innovates the higher is its
productivity: by observing the dynamics of the productivity it is possible to study the effects of the
institutional and regional context upon the innovation strategy of the ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst set of experiments consisted in benchmarking the innovation to explore the difference
among the results in terms of productivity levels obtained with several different duration times of the
patent protection and a benchmark ﬁgure, represented by the productivity level the agents achieved
with patent expiration set to one. To ensure the results were robust and systematic, each simulation
was run ten times by varying, for each run, the seed employed to generate pseudo random numbers;
the result of each experiment was computed as the average of the ten runs results.
The second set of experiments consisted in correlating innovation and patent expiration: ﬁfty
simulations was run varying, each time, both the random seed and the value of the patent expiration
parameter; the value was randomly tossed following a uniform distribution into the interval: ]1,255[.
The described approach ensured both the robustness of the results and the independence of the
parameters set up from any researcher's mental schemata.
Benchmarking the productivity
The following ﬁgure 2 shows the average results obtained in ﬁve different experiments based upon
diverse values for the patent expiration parameters.
The results of the ﬁrst one (patent expiration set to one) constitute our benchmark. Each experiment
consisted in running for several times (ten in this case) a simulation ﬁve hundred whole production-
consumption cycles long, with a determined value for the patent expiration parameter and different
random seed; the results of each simulation have been summarized by means of the average
productivity value computed tacking the reached values of each ﬁrm into the population of the model.
The distribution of those average values exhibited a very low variance allowing its usage as the
representative value and suggesting that the results were robust and fully independent from the
different random numbers distributions generated for each simulation starting from a diverse seed.
The graph shows that the four different scenarios (8, 55,144, 233) were not able to achieve the
benchmark (scenario 1), because the productivity level directly depended on the achieved
technological level, it would mean that the reinforcing effect has been systematically weaker than the
slowing one.
In sum the results conﬁrm that the stronger the IPR protection was (the more extended in time the
patent protection was) the slower the innovation process proceeded.
Figure 2. Histogram representing the results of the simulations.
More in details the following ﬁgure 3 shows that in all the simulations, the results were systematically
higher the lower was the patent expiration.4.22
4.23
4.24
Figure 3. Results reached in each of the ten simulations.
The ﬁgure 4 better shows the trend of the phenomena by drawing minimum and maximum results
obtained in each experiment.
Figure 4. Results of the experiments related to the value of the patent expiration parameter.
Correlating innovation and patent expiration
The ﬁgure 5 shows an early correlation between the patent duration and the productivity levels that
the simulated economy reaches, by grouping each set of ﬁve simulations picking the ﬁrst, second
etc. of each experiment under different values of the patent expiration parameter.
The results obtained by running ﬁfty simulations, ﬁve hundred production cycles long, with random
values for patent expiration demonstrate the existence of a negative correlation between patent rights
and innovation.4.25
4.26
Figure 5. Correlation between patent expiration and productivity.
The longer the patent right is the less the productivity level grows, as graphically illustrated by the
ﬁgure 6. The obtained correlation index is about -0.9; the distribution of the obtained results shows a
remarkable relative difference between the best case (patent expiration = 6) and the worst one
(patent expiration = 214). The two ﬁgures, respectively ﬁgure 6 and ﬁgure 7, illustrate the distribution
of the average productivity values and the distribution of the relative difference between each value
and the worst case one.
The productivity difference (dp) has been computed as: dpi = pi / min(p) - 1. Where pi represents the
productivity of the i-th experiments and min(p) the minimum productivity level achieved in all the
experiments. A similar algorithm has been employed to compute the patent expiration difference
(dpe): dpei = pei / max(pe) - 1.
Figure 6. Distribution of the average productivity during ﬁfty experiments with different










Figure 7. Distribution of the relative differences versus the worst case.
The second knowledge trade-off: the regional dissemination of knowledge
The second issue addressed by the simulation concerns the role of the distribution in regional space
of knowledge generating institutions, like research laboratories, universities and so on, in promoting
and sustaining the innovation.
We want to test the hypothesis that the dissemination of knowledge favours the growth of the
system. This very ﬁrst stage of the research has been focused on the inﬂuence that different
architectural distributions of the knowledge producers have on the dynamic of the innovation
process.
The distribution in regional space of knowledge producers (hereafter KP) is a valuable source for the
recombinant generation of new technological knowledge as they provide the opportunity to all the
other co-localized agents to access part of their proprietary knowledge in the form of knowledge
spillovers (Ozman 2009).
In order to maintain the model at a useful level of simplicity, the knowledge producers have been
dummied by some highly evolved ﬁrms whose distribution will affect the possibility for other ﬁrms to
take advantage of the technological knowledge spilling from them.
The distribution of knowledge has been simulated by inserting a small number of ﬁrms endowed with
a high level of technological knowledge (so called 'genius') into an environment populated by a wide
set of less developed ﬁrms.
The different distributions of genius and their number have been experimented in several scenarios,
i.e. under diverse set up of some basic parameters that determine the quality of information available,
the limits to the physical relocation, the capability to observe and copy others' strategy and so on.
Four different distributions for knowledge producers have been studied and compared by observing
their effects upon the evolution of the productivity, to ensure the distributions were stable knowledge
producers were not allowed to change their position into the physical space. In the four different
spaces we ﬁnd 250 normal ﬁrms and a certain number of knowledge-intensive ones (KP).
In each space the distribution of the high-tech ﬁrms is set up as follows:
one high knowledge district (One hkd): all the KPs are placed, very close among them, in a
small area at the centre of the space,
two high knowledge districts (Two hkds): the total number of KPs is split between two areas,
the ﬁrst located at the centre of the right upper quarter of the space and the former at the
centre of the left lower one,
four high knowledge districts (Four hkds): here the KPs are distributed around four points,
respectively at the centre of each quarter the whole space could be divided into,
no high knowledge district (No hkds): each KP is assigned a random position into the space
and lives alone.
The basic population of each region (about 250 agents, due to the fact each agent is assigned a
random space tossed following a uniform distribution) is randomly spread into the space.
Each set of experiments has been based upon a different combination of four parameters, so called
scenario, each of them has been assigned a name:
optimum: is the scenario devoted to re-create the theoretical condition of perfect information








typical: here the capabilities of the ﬁrms are limited to plausible amounts, in order to take in
account the typical limits existing into the real world,
mixed: the parameters have been randomly set up for each simulation, choosing their values
into an assigned range that include the "typical" values.
For each scenario a set of three different experiments have been done, by using, respectively 4, 16
and 64 KPs for each space. By varying the number of KPs the difference between each KPs
distribution model could be differently stressed: with 4 KPs for each space, there is few difference
between the diverse distribution of them and, practically, the Four hkds is one of the possible
distributions of the No hkds scenario.
The more the number of KPs is increased the higher become the difference among the four
distribution.
Table 1. Parameter conﬁgurations for each experiment.
Each experiment has been repeated for ﬁfty times always changing the random number distribution
to simulate different dynamics and validate the robustness of the obtained results.
Random numbers were used to simulate some decision, to pick up neighbours spilling relevant
external knowledge and to determine in which direction and how far to move. For the Mixed scenario
random numbers are used to toss the parameters value each within the appropriate range, as
illustrated in Table 1 where parameters for each scenario and simulation are shown.
Figure 8. Conﬁguration of the spaces for the simulations.
At the end of each experiment the average productivity level for each region and for the whole
population have been computed, at this very ﬁrst stage of the research these were the only data it
has been decided to concentrate on.
Since the initial endowment of the ﬁrms in each region was set to the same amount, the market was
unique both for factors and products, it is possible to assume differences among the reached level of
productivity were mainly due to the different distribution of the KPs; the ﬁgure 8 shows this
distribution.
Results of the Optimum scenario
The "Optimum" scenario has been set up to validate the model under the classic assumption of
perfect information and mobility: provided that each regional space is simulated by a square lattice






because the maximum distance between the worst and the best technology has been limited, in
these simulations, to 200 and knowledge absorption threshold of 999 means that each technology
could be copied. The patent expiration set to one means that each adopted technology becomes
quasi-public in the successive production cycle, so each technology could be copied as soon as it
has been adopted.
The value of the view parameter would have been set to ﬁfty too, as for the jump one, but ﬁfteen
demonstrated to be enough to allow a good circulation of information and guarantee the majority of
the enterprises reached the higher technological level in a very short time.
Under the optimum conditions, the concentrated distributions of KPs, as the One hkd and Two hkds
seem to give some advantages, as shown by the results brieﬂy summarized into the table 2: here
are reported, for each experiment, the average results, ﬁrst row, obtained during ﬁfty runs, with
different random distributions, each of them 250 whole production cycles long, the variance is
reported too, in the second row.
Table 2. synthesis of the results obtained by running the Optimum scenario.
With high levels of information quality, mobility, and capability of ﬁrms to absorb technological
knowledge from each other, and no patent protections, the concentrated distribution of knowledge
centres seem to give better results than the disseminated one, even if the advantage becomes
smaller and smaller when the number of KPs grows.
Starting from the scenario with only 4 KPs the disseminated region reached only 0.85 productivity
after 250 production cycles, whereas the full concentrated one reached 0.95, with an advantage of
about 0.1, but this difference fell to 0.02 and 0.001 respectively with 16 and 64 KPs.
The trend shown by the average values systematically appears in each single simulation as the
ﬁgure 9 graphically illustrates for the experiment Optimum 64: the graph reported the ﬁnal results of
each of the 50 simulations.
Figure 9. Results of several simulations of the experiment optimum 64
Results of the Typical scenario
This conﬁguration set has been obtained by giving the four parameters realistic and plausible values,
the regional neighbourhood of each ﬁrm has been presumed to be 64 cells wide, about 1/100 the
whole extension of the simulated world, where each cell was able to host more than one enterprise.
Pretending this neighbourhood to be the maximum extension a ﬁrm would have been able to reach,







Innovation cannot be done too fast, the absorption and recombination of external technological
knowledge implies the modiﬁcation of products and production processes and the upgrading of the
skills of the staff: it is not plausible that an enterprise can absorb unlimited amounts of external
technological knowledge. The limit of 4, represents 1/50 of the maximum technology a ﬁrm can reach
in the whole evolution, and four hundred times the ability each enterprise is pretended to acquire
each cycle by means of the "learning by doing".
It is also plausible that new techniques could be protected by a license, usually technical patents last
for ﬁve years, because each step of the simulation is pretended to last for one year, the expiration of
patent rights has been set up to ﬁve. Practically each ﬁrm can observe and absorb the other
technologies only if they are ﬁve cycles old. All these limitations reduced the speed of evolution, so
experiments for this scenario has been based upon one thousand cycles simulations long, even
though the enterprises reached productivity levels less than them obtained in the, non realistic,
Optimum scenario. The interesting results is that, under more realistic conditions relevant indications
about the better distribution of KPs seem to appear; as in the table 3, where are shown the average
results of ﬁfty runs for each experiment using the Typical scenario.
Table 3. synthesis of the results obtained by running the Typical scenario.
In all the three setups of KPs, the disseminated distribution provides better results, and the distance
become higher the higher the number of KPs is.
Analysing the four regions it is evident that the more the KPs are spread, the better become the
results, the advantage grows signiﬁcantly passing from the One hkd scenario region to the No hkds
one, reaching, for 64 KPs, 0,16. Figure 10 shows the results obtained during the 50 simulations for
the experiment typical 64.
Figure 10. Results of several simulations of the experiment typical 64
More disseminated distributions of the KPs seem to be more effective in facilitating the innovation
and in promoting technical progress, a plausible explanation could be that more disseminated
distributions allow a major number of ﬁrms to access knowledge; similar conﬁgurations, like four
hkds and no hkds in presence of four KPs only, gave very close results, conﬁrming this explanation.
Results of the Mixed scenario
The Mixed scenario has been built to test the results obtained into the typical one, here the
parameters set up is always changing, values are randomly tossed in ranges that are distributed
around the typical parameters value.




previous reasoning about the importance of a disseminated distribution for KPs seems to be
reinforced, as well as the observation about the similarity between the distribution Four hkds and No
hkds in presence of four KPs only.
Table 4. synthesis of the results obtained by running the Mixed scenario.
The difference among the four distribution is less strong, due to the fact the combination of
parameters allowed conﬁgurations closer to the Optimum scenario than the Typical ones, the
phenomenon is clearly shown into the graph in ﬁgure 11.
Figure 11. Results of several simulations of the experiment mixed 64
Taking advantage of the array of experimental conﬁgurations that agent based simulations offer, we
have generated a wide set of alternative scenarios.
For a comparative summarization it is possible to refer to the graphs in ﬁgures from 12 to 14 where
the data shown before are mixed in a bar diagram.
Figure 12. Comparison among results of the optimum scenario
Whereas in the Optimum scenario results are very similar for the three different distributions, the





Figure 13. Comparison among results of the typical scenario
The bar diagrams show also the performance of the disseminated distributions are better the higher
is the number of KPs, reinforcing the argument about the similarity of distributions in presence of few
KPs.
Figure 14. Comparison among results of the mixed scenario
 Policy implications
The implications for research and innovation policy are important: better access conditions to
technological knowledge and better dissemination of existing technological knowledge enable ﬁrms
to ﬁnd better their way toward technological enhancement so as to become more competitive and
proﬁtable. Let us consider them in turn.
Intellectual property rights regimes should be designed so as to increase the possibility for imitators
and users of external knowledge to take advantage of existing proprietary knowledge. The
implementation of non-exclusive intellectual property rights might favour the dissemination of
technological knowledge. The enforcement of compulsory royalty payments for all use of proprietary
knowledge should prevent the reduction of appropriability conditions and hence the decline of
incentives to funding research activities.
The demise of 'intramuros' research activities concentrated within the research laboratories of large
corporations and the implementation of open innovation systems that favour the outsourcing of the
recombinant generation of technological knowledge to specialized knowledge-intensive business
companies, and academic departments might help the dissemination of technological knowledge.
The access to technological knowledge should be increased favouring the distribution of universities
and public research centres across the system so as to improve the proximity of ﬁrms to the
available pools of public knowledge and reduce the distance of peripheral regions from the
knowledge spillovers. In a similar vein the inﬂow of foreign direct investment and the location of
advanced multinational companies should be favored as a tool for local ﬁrms to access the spillovers






The dissemination of existing technological knowledge should become the object of dedicated policy
tools. The strengthening of the relations between the business community and the public research
system and speciﬁcally between ﬁrms and universities might help the effective dissemination of
knowledge and knowledge generating competence. Public policy should support all interactions
between academics and ﬁrms favouring the actual creation of additional pecuniary knowledge
externalities with the provision of subsidies and ﬁscal allowances to all contracts between ﬁrms and
the academic system. The dissemination and implementation of a fabric of good quality public
research centers and universities through out the system is likely to generate better results that the
concentration of centers of worldwide excellence in a few spots. For the same reasons the mobility
of skilled and creative scientists and experts among ﬁrms and between ﬁrms and research
institutions at large can become the target of dedicated research policy interventions aimed at
spreading competence and technological expertise.
 Conclusion
This paper has implemented an evolutionary approach that integrates strong Marshallian and
Schumpeterian traits with the recent advances in the economics of complexity, innovation can be
considered as an emerging property of an economic system that takes place when its structural
characteristics provide access to external knowledge as an indispensable input into the generation of
new technological knowledge. Building upon the Marshallian legacy, external knowledge is
considered an indispensable input, together with internal research activities, into the recombinant
generation of new knowledge. The reappraisal of the Schumpeterian notion of innovation as a
conditional result of a form of reaction to un-expected events, led to articulate the hypothesis that the
reaction of myopic but creative agents, that try and cope with the changing conditions of their product
and factor markets, may lead to the effective recombinant generation of new technological
knowledge and hence the actual introduction of productivity enhancing innovations when they are
embedded in an organized complexity where they can actually take advantage of the external
knowledge available within the innovation system into which they are embedded.
In this context ABM enabled to explore the effects of alternative institutional. organizational and
architectural conﬁgurations of the knowledge structure of the system in assessing the chances to
pursue effectively the recombinant generation of new technological knowledge and to introduce
technological innovations. The introduction of innovations is analyzed as the result of systemic
interactions among learning agents. The reaction of agents may become creative, as opposed to
adaptive, so as to lead to the introduction of productivity enhancing innovations when external
knowledge can be accessed at low costs and used in the recombinant generation of new
technological knowledge. Building upon agent-based simulation techniques the paper has explored
the effects that alternative conﬁgurations of the intellectual property right regimes and architectural
conﬁgurations of the system play in assessing these costs and hence the chances to perform
effectively the recombinant generation of new technological knowledge.
The results of the ABM conﬁrm that a system characterized by high levels of knowledge
dissemination is actually more effective in promoting the rates of introduction of technological
innovations. The results however show that systems characterized by high levels of concentration
could offer advantages in terms of faster discovery, due to the close relations that could be
established among the knowledge producers. The implementation of an ABM has enabled the
rigorous framing of a complex system dynamics where innovation is the emerging property that
takes place when a number of complementary conditions qualify the reaction of ﬁrms and make them
creative. The simulation model can be applied to control the implications of an array of alternative
settings and hypotheses concerning appropriability conditions, intellectual property rights regimes,
knowledge generation routines and, most important, policy interventions that can alter the structure of
knowledge ﬂows so as to increase the levels of organization of the complexity of a system.
Taking inspiration from Schumpeter and Marshall, and the recent developments in the analysis of the
economic complexity of technological change, the ABM has shown the systemic conditions that
make innovation possible. Innovation is an emergent property of the organized complexity of a
system because innovation is as the outcome of a situated and localized reaction when it can take
advantage of a collective and situated process, embedded in institutional as well structural settings,
and involving the combination of in-house and external knowledge and capabilities. Additionally the
uncertain outcome of these endeavours is portrayed as stochastic functions (lotteries) emphasizing
that there is no automaticity as regards success in both activities. In this context an important aspect
of the present elaboration is that the spatial distribution of innovation activities is explained
endogenously from the interaction of competing ﬁrms.
Summarizing the results of the present simulation it seems to be possible to pretend that the more
the knowledge producers, like universities and advanced science-base corporations, are spread
upon the territory and the faster and more effective becomes the innovation process. Myopic but
creative ﬁrms coping with the changing conditions of their product and factor markets are better able
to improve their reaction and make it creative, as opposed to adaptive, when technological
knowledge is disseminated in the regional, institutional and technological spaces.
 APPENDIXA - The pseudo code of the model
Repeat-until the end of the simulation
 Each worker Computes its own wealth as sum of wages and  dividends
 Each agent Computes the average profit of the neighbourhood
   Sends order to the market to buy factor 
   Computes its final production as employed factor * productivity
   Sends to the market the supplied quantity of product
   Upgrades its own potential
 Each worker Sends to the market its own demand equal to its whole wealth
 The market  Computes sell prices for product as demand / supply
   Computes buy prices for factor as a linear function of the demand for factor
 Each agent Computes its income as production * sell price
Computes the amount of wages as employed factor * buy price + research costs
   Computes its profit or loss by subtracting wages from the income 
   Computes dividends to pay as profit / workers
   Pays wages to the workers
   Pays dividend to the workers
   If profit greater than zero 
    Increases demand for factor by 1%
   Else
    Decreases demand for factor by 1%
   End-if
   If profit is far from the neighbourhood profit
    If enough potential has been cumulated
     Increases productivity
     Decreases potential
     Increases research costs
    Else
     Looks for neighbouring technologies to absorb
     If found 
      Upgrades productivity
      Increases research costs
     Else
      Moves randomly to another location
      Increases research costs
     End-if
    End-if
   Else
    If a randomly tossed number is lower than the patent duration
     If enough potential has been cumulated
      Increases productivity
      Decreases potential
      Increases research costs
     Else
      Looks for neighbouring technologies to absorb
      If found 
       Upgrades productivity
       Increases research costs
      End-if
     End-if
    End-if
   End-if
 The model  Computes statistics 
   Writes statistics on the output files
End-repeat-until
B - Flow diagrams describing the model processesFigure 15. Process performed by the simulation schedulerFigure 16. Processes performed by the workersFigure 17. Processes performed by the marketFigure 18. Processes performed by the ﬁrms - part 1Figure 19. Processes performed by the ﬁrms - part 2Figure 20. Processes performed by the ﬁrms - part 3Figure 21. Processes performed by the ﬁrms - part 48.1
8.2
Figure 22. Processes performed by the ﬁrms - part 5
C - The analytical representation of the model
This appendix presents the analytical organization of the simulation model and the founding
equations.
The production activity is speciﬁed following a simple linear function:
1.  Oi = ˀi Li. 
Where the output (O), of a generic i-th enterprise, depends upon the employed labour (L) and
its productivity (ˀ). The latter can vary between 0 and 1. Customers (i.e. workers, share
holders and researchers) spend the whole amount they earn in buying goods, so the selling
price for goods is simply computed as:
2.  p = Y/ʣ Oi. 
Where Y represents the whole amount earned by the customers and n is the number of
enterprises operating into the simulated economy, hence Y accounts for the sum of W the
amount of wages, R the expenses for research and D the dividends:
3.  Y = W + R + D. 
The unit wage (w) for a single work unit is the same for each enterprise; it is centrally
computed as a linear function:
4.  w = 50 + 0.005ʣLi. Each enterprise pays its workers a total amount of wages (W) of:
5.  Wi = wLi. 
The whole amount of wages is simply computable as:
6.  W = ʣWi. 
The research costs is directly related to the distance between the old and the new position of
the enterprise in each space:
7.  Ri = dTi + dFi. 
Where dT and dF are the technological and regional distance covered by the ﬁrm in its
innovation process. The whole amount research suppliers receive is:
8.  R = ʣRi. 
Naming P the proﬁt of a generic enterprise gives the following equation:
9.  Di = Pi = pOi - Wi - Ri. 
Where D could be less than zero if a loss had to be reintegrated. The amount of dividends paid
to the whole systems is:
10.  D = ʣDi. 
At the aggregate level the system could be resumed by substituting into the expression 3 the
expressions 6, 8 and 10 to obtain:
11.  Y = ʣWi + ʣRi + ʣDi. 
By specifying Di using the expression 9 it is possible to obtain:
12.  Y = ʣWi + ʣRi + ʣpOi - ʣWi - ʣRi. 
By operating simple compensations the expression 12 becomes:
13.  Y = ʣpOi. 
Recalling the expression 2 it is evident that the whole system can reach equilibrium and the
amount of money into the system remains always constant. 
The position into the technological space determines the ﬁrm's productivity: the grid is 100
cells wide, both horizontally and vertically, the productivity (ˀ) grows toward the upper right
corner of the space following a trivial rule:
14.  ˀi = (tXi + tYi)/200. 
Into the formula 14 tX and tY represent the, horizontal and vertical, technological position of the
i-th enterprise; innovation means increasing the productivity by moving up the cumulate X and
Y position. 
The model reproduces each production cycle by starting with the provisioning of factors to end
computing proﬁts and paying dividend, wages and research services. 
First each enterprise sends to the market its request of work units; in this model workers are
extremely ﬂexible, they could work for different enterprises few hours for each. The amount of
work force each ﬁrm will employ depends on the results it has obtained during the previous
cycle: if the ﬁrm has just obtained a proﬁt it will try to expand its production by rising the
number of work unit, as well as in case of loss it will reduce the usage of work. After all the
ﬁrms have sent their orders the market, computes a homogeneous unit wage:
15.  Li
 t = f(Pi
 t-1).
16.  wt = 50 + 0.005ʣ Li
 t. 
The production of each ﬁrm depends on the amount of work it employs and its own
productivity, so:
17.  Oi
 t = ˀi t Li
 t. 
After producing the ﬁrms send to the market their output, as well as the consumers send to the
market the amount of money they intend to spend; using such data the market is able to
compute the price for a single product unit, that will be cashed by all the enterprises. Note that,
because the decision about how much research to do is taken by the enterprises only at the
end of the production cycle, the total amount of money consumers are given in payment for
research depends on the decision taken two times before. Hence the price is computed as it
follows:
18.  pt = (W t-1 + D t-1 + R t-2)/ʣ Oi
 t. 
The production cycle ends with the enterprises cashing their sales, paying wages and
research services, computing the proﬁts, and distributing dividends or collecting money from
the shareholders to face losses. 
In the model shareholders fund all losses by investing new capital, but such a behaviour can
not be maintained for a long time, so enterprises can afford a limited amount of cumulated loss
before closing. After each production cycle enterprises cumulate the proﬁt, or loss, in a
counter, when the cumulated amount is greater than a threshold, managed as model's
parameter, named "max loss" the enterprise stops its activity and disappears. 
Each time an enterprise closes it lives room for a new one that can ﬁll the supply gap; usually
this process takes time to be completed, so in the model a dead enterprise is replaced by a
new one after a deﬁned number of production cycles, managed by the parameter "revamp
time". New enterprises are physically located in the place leaved by the dead ones, but they
adopt a technological level equal to the current public average level of the neighbourhood. Firms compare their results with the average proﬁt obtained by they neighbours: if their results
are lower or larger than the average they try and innovate by funding research activities to
improve their productivity. Assuming that each ﬁrm has a certain number of neighbours (m),
this process could be resumed as:
19.  Ri
 t = f(Pi
 t , ʣ ; Pj
 t) / m. 
The comparison between own and neighbours results is biased by a "tolerance" (_) value, one
of the several model's parameters, that could vary between zero, that means no tolerance, and
inﬁnite, that means maximum tolerance. In this way the ﬁrm compute a difference able to
motivate innovation, only if:
20.  pi
 t < (1 - ʵ) ʣ Pj
 t / m. 
or
21.  pi
 t > (1 - ʵ) ʣ Pj
 t / m. 
The introduction of innovations is the result of research activities complemented by the
mobilization of competence based upon learning processes, knowledge absorption from
neighbours, change in location. 
Accumulation of experience proceeds at a speciﬁc "learning rate" (lr). The learning rate is the
same for all the enterprise and is managed as a model's parameter, so different values for it
could be experimented. It represents the fraction of productivity growth that can be gained and
added for each production cycle. It is biased by a "learning factor" (lf), that accounts for the
competence level of the enterprises' localized in the neighbourhoods, measured as the
average productivity of the neighbours enterprises (ˀn). 
Firms operating in a neighbourhood whose average productivity is greater than 0.5 (the
average level for the model's productivity range as sub expression 1) are able to increase their
potential faster than the learning factor, as well as learning of ﬁrms included in lower productive
neighbourhoods is less than the learning factor. 
Equation 22 describes the algorithm used to compute learning:
22.  tpi
 t = tpi
 t-1 + lr * lf * (ˀn i
 t - 0.5)2. 
Where (tp) is the technological potential; (lf) is the "learning factor"; (lr) is the "learning rate",
and (ˀn) measures the average productivity of the neighbours enterprises. 
The competence can be transformed in real innovation when a threshold is reached and
almost one unit is achieved: ﬁrms innovate and move from the original technology to another
one that is one technological unit greater and increase the productivity by 1/200. Such
enhancement has a cost proportional to the enhancement. 
If the cumulated potential is not enough to support an innovation, ﬁrms can observe and
absorb the technology of their neighbours. Knowledge absorption, however, because of
absorbing costs, is not free. In order to increase the plausibility of the model ﬁrms can absorb
only the technologies that are similar to their own, in other words they cannot pass from a very
low technological level to a high one directly. 
Because of bounded rationality, ﬁrms can observe only the other ones that lay in a certain
neighbourhood whose extension depends on the "view" (v) parameter: this value limits the
number of positions all around the agent it can explore. Due to the fact the simulated world is
managed as a grid the position of the agent could bias this view: agents in a corner have less
possibility to observe than other located in the middle of the grid, as well as agents in a very
crowded neighbours have more information than isolated ﬁrms. Note that a single position into
the grid could pile several agents, so simply exploring its cell an agent may found other ﬁrms to
observe. 
The view parameter determines only the number of cells the agent can access, the real
number of other ﬁrms it can observe depend upon the evolution of the agents' distribution and
constitutes an emerging phenomenon that continuously evolves during the execution of the
simulation. Saying c to be the number of accessible cells and v the value of the view
parameter, each agent can potentially access a number of cells of:
23.  c = (v * 2 + 1)2. 
When the agent is located near the end of the grid its capability falls dramatically, for instance
the number of cells an agent located in a corner can access is:
24.  c = (v + 1)2. 
By observing other ﬁrms an enterprise knows the latest technological level they apply that is
not covered by a patent licence. A speciﬁc model's parameter "patent duration" (pd) is used to
experiment different scenarios, its value determines the number of production cycles each
innovation remains hidden to the competitors, accordingly with the following formula where pT
represents the public technology of a ﬁrm and T the private one:
25.  pTi
 t = Ti
 t-pd . 
The two values are the same only at the start of the simulation and for ﬁrms that did not adopt
any innovation during the past production cycles. Observed technologies can be absorbed only if the distance between them and the own ones
is less than a parametrical value, so called "knowledge absorption threshold". This limitation
has been introduced to avoid dramatic jumps in the productivity of ﬁrms that would be not
plausible. Knowledge absorption has a cost equal to the named distance too. 
Each time an enterprise found it self far from the neighbours, but has not yet reached enough
motivation to innovate, it tries to absorb external knowledge with a probability (ip) of:
26.  26 ip = pd / 100. 
Note that, in this case, knowledge absorption only is performed if there are no chances to
absorb external knowledge, that could only be due to the neighbours are too much
technologically advanced, no other strategies are performed. 
The third way to innovate consists in moving around the regional space in order to reach more
interesting neighbours. When the mobilization of the potential competence and knowledge
absorption cannot be performed successfully, ﬁrms move randomly to another location in the
hope to found better developed zones. Movement is limited by a parameter called "jump", its
value determines the maximum amount of cells the ﬁrms can go through vertically and
horizontally back or forward; the effective number of cells the enterprise will move is
determined randomly into this range, that constitutes a Von Neumann's neighbour. Moving
costs are equal to the innovating ones.
D - Results of the experiments
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 Notes
1 The authors acknowledge the ﬁnancial support of the European Union D.G. Research with the
Grant number 266959 to the research project 'Policy Incentives for the Creation of Knowledge:
Methods and Evidence' (PICK-ME), within the context Cooperation Program / Theme 8 / Socio-
economic Sciences and Humanities (SSH), of the Collegio Carlo Alberto and of the University of
Torino. We are grateful to the referees, the Editor and Pietro Terna for the useful comments to
preliminary versions.2 Schumpeter (1947) makes the point very clear: "What has not been adequately appreciated among
theorists is the distinction between different kinds of reaction to changes in 'condition'. Whenever an
economy or a sector of an economy adapts itself to a change in its data in the way that traditional
theory describes, whenever, that is, an economy reacts to an increase in population by simply
adding the new brains and hands to the working force in the existing employment, or an industry
reacts to a protective duty by the expansion within its existing practice, we may speak of the
development as an adaptive response. And whenever the economy or an industry or some ﬁrms in
an industry do something else, something that is outside of the range of existing practice, we may
speak of creative response. Creative response has at least three essential characteristics. First,
from the standpoint of the observer who is in full possession of all relevant facts, it can always be
understood ex post; but it can be practically never be understood ex ante; that is to say, it cannot be
predicted by applying the ordinary rules of inference from the pre-existing facts. This is why the 'how'
in what has been called the 'mechanisms' must be investigated in each case. Secondly, creative
response shapes the whole course of subsequent events and their 'long-run' outcome. It is not true
that both types of responses dominate only what the economist loves to call 'transitions', leaving the
ultimate outcome to be determined by the initial data. Creative response changes social and
economic situations for good, or, to put it differently, it creates situations from which there is no bridge
to those situations that might have emerged in the absence. This is why creative response is an
essential element in the historical process; no deterministic credo avails against this. Thirdly, creative
response -the frequency of its occurrence in a group, its intensity and success or failure- has
obviously something, be that much or little, to do (a) with quality of the personnel available in a
society, (b) with relative quality of personnel, that is, with quality available to a particular ﬁeld of
activity relative to the quality available, at the same time, to others, and (c) with individual decisions,
actions, and patterns of behavior." (Schumpeter 1947:149-150).
3 Empirical investigations and tests of speciﬁc hypotheses can complement and support agent-
based simulations. See Antonelli and Scellato (2011) and Antonelli, Patrucco Quatraro (2011).
4 The pseudo code of the model can be found in the Appendix A, ﬂow charts describing the
processes performed by the agents are shown in Appendix B, and the analytical organization of the
model with the founding equations are detailed in Appendix C.
5 The whole collection of all experiments data is available in Appendix D.
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